Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide by Ludlow, D. R.L.
Humanitarian Intervention and the Rwandan Genocide 
by  
D.R.L. Ludlow  
In these past few months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an 
opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United 
Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and 
human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, "social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom."  
                                                                                    Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
                                                                                    An Agenda for Peace (1992) 
INTRODUCTION  
In writing An Agenda for Peace, Boutros Boutros-Ghali captured the sense of growing 
optimism among many statesmen in the early 1990s that the international community had 
entered a new era where combined action by its members could reduce conflicts and 
alleviate the suffering of those affected by them. Yet, only two years after the Secretary-
General wrote so confidently of new attitudes and possibilities, over a half a million 
people were brutally killed in the Rwandan genocide and civil war as the international 
community stood by and watched. Perhaps of all the recent cases for international 
intervention, Rwanda was the most striking and yet nothing was done. What went wrong? 
Why was there such a stark contrast between aspirations and reality?  
This article will attempt to answer these questions. It will examine the obstacles to 
humanitarian intervention in international society1 today using the Rwandan genocide as 
a case study. It takes as its premise that there are four possible reasons why the 
international community fails to intervene in a given humanitarian crisis. These potential 
obstacles are:  
• that there is an absence of any internationally recognized justification, either in 
theory or practise, for humanitarian intervention;  
• that, even if there is a generally accepted right of humanitarian intervention, it is 
not recognized in that particular case;  
• that there is an inability within the international community to intervene in 
humanitarian crises in a timely manner; and  
• that there is an unwillingness on the part of members of the international 
community to intervene in order to save the lives of others.  
This article will examine which of these obstacles caused the failure of the international 
community to intervene in Rwanda. It will be argued that while each of the above 
obstacles did pose a challenge to decisive intervention in Rwanda, by far the most 
significant was the last, that being an unwillingness on the part of state governments to 
take action solely on humanitarian grounds.  
The article is divided into two sections. Part one discusses whether there is any clearly 
recognized principle for intervention on humanitarian grounds in international society. 
Drawing on solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society, the arguments for 
and against humanitarian intervention will be examined, as well as how these arguments 
are supported by the United Nations (UN) Charter and international law. Finally, the 
issue of whether a norm of humanitarian intervention is evident in international practise 
will be examined. It will be argued that while there are clear theoretical and legal 
justifications for humanitarian intervention, these are only marginally recognized in 
recent practise of the international community.  
Having examined general theory, the second part of the article will deal specifically with 
Rwanda. It will start by examining whether the principle of humanitarian intervention 
was advanced by the UN in response to the Rwandan crisis. Then the more practical 
obstacles to intervention in Rwanda will be discussed, examining the ability of the 
international community to respond to humanitarian crises and the willingness of its 
members to become involved. It will be argued that while a number of systemic 
weaknesses within the UN may have proven problematic, the real obstacle was the 
unwillingness of national governments to accept the risks of a military intervention in the 
absence of any clearly defined national interests.  
The article will conclude by drawing on the lessons of Rwanda to make some general 
observations regarding humanitarian interventions in international society. Issues for 
further investigation and research will also be identified.  
Definitions  
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define clearly what is meant by humanitarian 
intervention. The type of intervention under discussion is forced military intervention, 
sanctioned by the United Nations, in the affairs of a sovereign state, based primarily on 
humanitarian grounds. There are two key elements to this definition. First, there is a 
clear lack of consent on the part of the target state and, second, the intervention is 
motivated by humanitarian concerns, such as human suffering or a threat to lives.  
Some have argued for a wide definition of humanitarian interventions in order to 
understand the best ways to deal with the increasingly complex humanitarian crises in the 
world today.2 This argument is based on the fact that humanitarian activities and 
international interventions today take many forms. Foreign aid and development 
programs by individual states, the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
diplomatic and economic sanctions or attempts at third party mediation are all to be 
considered humanitarian interventions in this broad context. While this may be a valid 
approach, many such forms of intervention do not pose a direct challenge to state 
sovereignty and may be aimed at a variety of sources of human suffering.  
This article is concerned with situations where armed conflict or the resident government 
itself is the cause of suffering or poses a threat to human lives. As armed intervention in a 
sovereign state must be seen as an extreme act under extreme conditions, actions less 
than military force may demonstrate less commitment and resolve on the part of the 
interveners. Thus, military interventions on humanitarian grounds will be our focus.  
JUSTIFICATION FOR INTERVENTION  
Several authors have noted how the principles of order and justice in international 
relations are most starkly contrasted over the question of humanitarian intervention.3 The 
requirement for international order demands respect of state sovereignty while calls for 
justice by alleviating human suffering and rights abuses disregard the "presumption of 
non-intervention." As James Mayall has noted, this dilemma of humanitarian intervention 
is best understood by juxtaposing solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international 
society.4 Each of these two approaches will be examined, together with how they are 
reflected in the UN Charter and international law.  
Solidarism  
A solidarist conception of international society is based on the belief that there is a 
community of mankind, current or potential, that transcends the society of sovereign 
states. This cosmopolitan society has its origins in the notion, best articulated by 
Immanuel Kant, that human beings are moral ends in themselves and not simply the 
objects of a state or means to its existence.5 A belief in the inherent value of individuals 
leads directly to a requirement for human rights. Human rights are best described as 
universal rights that all people have by virtue of being members of the human race:  
. . . because being human cannot be renounced, lost or forfeited, human rights are 
inalienable. In practise not all people enjoy all their human rights, let alone enjoy them 
equally. Nonetheless, all human beings have the same human rights and hold them 
equally and inalienably.6
Such universality was recognized by the United Nations General Assembly in the 
preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, in stating that "the 
inherent dignity ... and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."7  
Human rights have two key elements associated with them. First, there is clearly a right 
to something. Human rights scholars have suggested a wide variety of approaches to 
defining the rights to which all humans are entitled.8 Clearly the consensus of all 
approaches is that the right to life must be considered foremost. Acceptance of the right 
to life necessarily implies others, such as the subsistence needs of food, water, shelter and 
security. Although scholars do not agree on a comprehensive or prioritized list of rights, 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 is instructive in this regard. It lists, in 
order, the right to life, liberty and security of person, freedom from slavery or servitude 
and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.9 While this list 
clearly does not reflect the rights that all people currently enjoy, they do represent an 
international consensus on the rights that all humans ought to enjoy.  
The second key element of human rights is that there exists an obligation on the part of 
others to guarantee them. This obligation leads to the solidarist assertion that states are 
responsible mainly for the preservation and promotion of their citizens' welfare. While 
individuals have obligations to respect one another's rights, it is in the context of society, 
organized as a state, that humans are best able to realize their rights. Herein lies a great 
dilemma: "The . . . fundamental freedoms asserted by human rights law are very largely 
rights to be exercised against state power; yet it is state power itself which is expected to 
protect those rights."10  
A solidarist conception of international society does not deny the necessity or legitimacy 
of the state's role in ordering the relations and pursuing the interests of its citizens. 
Rather, solidarists question whether a state has any moral legitimacy independent of the 
people within its borders: ". . . states qua states do not think or will or act in pursuit of 
ends; only people . . . alone or in groups, do these things. Unless some independent sense 
can be given to the idea of the state as a moral agent, this view cannot be very 
persuasive."11 The primary responsibility of the state is to organize society and provide 
for the welfare of its citizens and this is recognized in the concept of sovereignty. The 
sovereign authority of states implies that each enjoys autonomy and freedom from 
external interference in pursuing its interests. Solidarists argue, though, that this 
autonomy must not be seen as absolute, but rather within the context of human rights. 
They believe it is in order to protect the rights of its citizens, promote their welfare and 
pursue their common ends that a state requires freedom from external interference. If a 
state government is failing to meet its obligations in fulfilling the basic human rights of 
its citizens, solidarists suggest there is no reason to recognize its claim to sovereign 
authority as legitimate.  
This is precisely the point Fernando Teson makes in asserting that "a government that 
engages in substantial violations of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it 
exists and so forfeits not only its domestic legitimacy, but its international legitimacy as 
well."12 If such a government loses its claim to legitimacy there are two important 
implications. First, it loses its claim to autonomy and freedom from external interference. 
Second, the obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens ultimately defaults to all 
of humanity. Given that the community of humans is for practical purposes organized 
into states, the policing of human rights abuses is best dealt with by the society of states.  
Solidarists point to Chapter VII of the UN Charter as providing the legal basis for 
intervention in the event of gross human rights abuses. Article 42 of this chapter 
authorizes the Security Council to "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."13 Under Article 43, 
"all members undertake to make available to the Security Council . . . armed forces"14 
for the purposes of enforcement, although this task may be delegated to specific states to 
carry out on behalf of the UN. Of particular note is the 1948 Convention on Genocide 
which makes genocide a crime under international law and commits all members to 
"prevent and punish" it.15  
Solidarists assert that human rights violations and widespread suffering cause instability 
and thereby threaten international peace. The authors of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights seem to acknowledge this in stating that "it is essential, if man is not to be 
compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, 
that human rights should be protected."16 Since violent human rights abuses and large-
scale human suffering threaten international peace and stability, the UN may intervene 
forcefully to preserve them.  
A solidarist conception of international society, then, argues that all humans are ends in 
themselves and thus possess basic inalienable human rights. While human rights are best 
realized within the context of sovereign states, a state may lose its claim to non-
interference if it fails to protect these basic rights for its citizens. The international 
community is justified, and the UN Security Council is authorized under international 
law, to intervene in a sovereign state to safeguard basic human rights. The maintenance 
of order does not preclude the pursuit of justice in international society; the former does 
not and must not always "trump" the latter. This is the solidarist argument in favor of 
humanitarian intervention.  
Pluralism  
A pluralist conception of international society denies the existence of basic human rights 
and is based on the belief that no common community of mankind exists. Pluralists argue 
that a variety of political cultures, based on different moral values, exists among the 
society of states. In order to protect these values and preserve the distinct ways of life of 
each state's citizens, pluralists believe the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention 
are key to both order and justice in the international community.  
Pluralists do not deny that certain rights and duties exist in international society, but 
claim these only exist with regard to states and not peoples, noting that the members of 
the United Nations are undisputedly the former and not the latter. They point to Article 
2(7) of the UN Charter which recognizes the sovereign equality of all states and declares 
"nothing [in the Charter] shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."17 More to the point, they 
argue, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law is proof of acceptance by 
the international community of the principle of non-intervention as a basis for stability: ". 
. . the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and the letter of the 
Charter, but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and 
security. . .."18  
Based on the above, pluralists criticize the solidarist advocacy of humanitarian 
intervention on three main grounds: first, cultural relativism; second, the importance of 
maintaining order; and third, the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention. Each of 
these criticisms is serious and requires some consideration.  
Cultural Relativism  
The argument for cultural relativism is based on the assertion that there is no universal 
conception of human rights. Advocates of cultural relativism note that it is only Western 
democracies that place great emphasis on human rights, while in many other parts of the 
world individual freedoms rank below the needs of family or community. R.J. Vincent 
summarizes well the case for cultural relativism:  
There is no universal morality, because the history of the world is the story of the 
plurality of cultures, and the attempt to assert universality . . . as a criterion of all 
morality, is a more or less well-disguised version of the imperial routine of trying to 
make the values of a particular culture general.19
One common explanation of the relative difference between cultures has the "first world" 
emphasizing civil and political rights, the "second world" (socialist) emphasizing 
economic and social rights and the "third world" emphasizing self-determination of 
peoples and economic development.20 None of these rights are mutually exclusive, but 
different societies do give them quite different priorities. In order to preserve and protect 
cultural distinctiveness, state sovereignty must be respected, thereby creating a 
"presumption against intervention."  
However, as Simon Caney has noted, there are two weaknesses to this argument. First, it 
denies any commonality of values among the world's cultures when in fact some 
consistency does exist:  
All cultures, be they Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, secular or Christian, value the sanctity of 
human life. Similarly, it is difficult to think of any culture that welcomes drought, famine, 
disease, murder and malnutrition. Consequently cosmopolitan principles of humanitarian 
intervention that seek to eradicate these are not imposing values on societies which those 
societies reject.21
No society asserts mass murder or the infliction of suffering on others as a cultural value. 
The second weakness is that it equates cultures with states, assuming that all governments 
promote pluralism and protect the cultural values of their citizens. Again, Caney 
suggests:  
In some situations intervention may . . . be required in order to protect and foster 
diversity. Consider a situation in which a state is persecuting a cultural minority. In such 
a scenario humanitarian intervention can be justified if it prevents this state of affairs and 
protects the minority.22
Clearly, then, there is a basic level of human rights that all cultures value and which 
states are required to protect. Thus, states have no claim to absolute sovereignty on the 
basis of cultural uniqueness if they constantly abuse basic human rights.  
Even if a basic set of human rights is accepted across all cultures, many argue that there 
is no international consensus on specifically what these rights are, what priority they have 
and which would have to be violated to justify intervention. This criticism is of a 
different nature because, while accepting that "in theory" there may be basic human 
rights, it argues that "in practise" they are not currently definable. Or as Adam Roberts 
writes:  
Any attempt to devise a general justification for humanitarian intervention, even if such a 
doctrine were to limit intervention to very extreme circumstances, would run into 
difficulty. A blind humanitarianism, which fails to perceive the basic truth that different 
states perceive social and international problems very differently, can only lead into a 
blind alley. Indeed, advocacy of any general principle of humanitarian intervention could 
well make some states more nervous than before about international discussion of human 
rights, since they might see this as a stalking horse for intervention.23
This is a valid point, however, the difficulty of achieving a consensus should not preclude 
the international community from attempting such a project. Moreover, if talk of 
humanitarian intervention might encourage some states to withdraw from the discussion, 
a lack of international will to address the subject might encourage others to continue, or 
even increase, human rights abuses within their borders.  
The argument for armed humanitarian intervention will always be made in extreme cases 
and will not develop into a general license to interfere in the domestic affairs of states:  
Not every evil, nor every violation of human rights, therefore, merits external 
intervention, even when it takes such grotesque and unacceptable forms as apartheid, 
human sacrifice, bonded labour, female infanticide, untouchability, and racial or religious 
discrimination. In many cases, influencing the state by other means is enough to achieve 
the desired results.24
Thus, while there is great cultural diversity in the world, all cultures value the 
preservation of human life and freedom from serious suffering. This implies that 
intervention is justified when lives are threatened or there is human suffering on a large 
scale. The difficulty of defining conditions for international humanitarian intervention 
should not stop the international community from trying to do so. The arguments of 
cultural relativism, then, do not preclude intervention in the event of a humanitarian 
crisis; rather they make us cautious in proceeding.  
Dangerous Precedents  
Arguments against humanitarian intervention based on the dangers of establishing 
precedents raise concerns with regards to the collapse of international order and the 
potential for abuse or selectivity. Concern over the collapse of order due to an erosion of 
the principle of state sovereignty is at best alarmist. It fails to take into consideration that 
the concept of sovereignty has taken several centuries to develop and that it continues to 
evolve. It is reasonable to expect that norms of humanitarian intervention will also take 
considerable time to develop as international society continues to modify and adapt 
notions of state sovereignty.  
Besides alarmism, the concern over dangerous precedents unjustifiably places an 
emphasis on issues of order and non-intervention over those of justice. The preference for 
order and the principle of sovereignty is wrongly presented as an objective, and thus 
more desirable, goal while justice and the principle of intervention are characterized as 
having bias toward a particular moral view.  
. . . nonintervention is not, as Vincent put it, an 'amoral' principle. It is rooted in a 
substantive conception of how the world should be arranged of which a necessary 
element is the belief that there is no 'coherent and pervasive morality which transcends 
international frontiers and which might then inform and justify particular acts of 
intervention.' To one who holds a conflicting belief, the nonintervention principle would 
not be a neutral principle at all.25
Thus, while arguing that humanitarian interventions may establish destabilizing 
international precedents, advocates of this position neglect to consider the dangers of 
establishing precedents based on ignoring widespread human rights abuses. As Caney 
observes, "the problem is that it is not clear why international order is assumed to be 
unconditionally valuable . . . if a state of affairs is unjust and exploitive it is far from clear 
that stabilizing it is desirable."26 If the international community established precedents 
for intervening on humanitarian grounds in cases of gross human rights abuses or 
suffering, it is far from clear why this would be undesirable.  
The second charge with regard to establishing dangerous precedents is that it is open to 
abuse or selectivity. Both of these concerns are valid and are based on the likelihood that 
states will intervene to serve their own interests and not humanitarian interests. If a 
general right of humanitarian intervention was recognized by the international 
community, it could be used as an excuse by any state to interfere in the affairs of 
another. Historically, such abuses have occurred. Michael Walzer has written that an 
historical study of interventions reveals: ". . . clear examples of what is called 
'humanitarian interventions' are very rare. Indeed, I have not found any, but only mixed 
cases where the humanitarian motive is one among several."27  
However, most such interventions have been unilateral and have been roundly 
condemned by the United Nations and its members.28 It must be remembered that the 
type of action under discussion in this article is armed intervention under the auspices of 
the United Nations. The requirement for an international consensus based on the support 
of the Security Council should prevent abuse of the principle by one or even several 
powers.  
If the UN Security Council authorises an intervention, the risks of competitive chaos and 
insecurity and of pursuit of unilateral advantage may be greatly reduced. The role of the 
UN, especially the Security Council, has given a degree of international legitimacy to 
uses of force that might otherwise have been open to extensive criticism.29
Such multilateralism has long been associated with legitimacy and it must continue to be 
considered key for humanitarian interventions.30  
Selectivity is a significant concern, particularly given the monopoly of control that the 
permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) 
exercise over the Security Council. If a security or humanitarian crisis does not affect one 
or more of these great powers, it is unlikely to be given much emphasis in the Security 
Council agenda. Crises in more obscure regions of the world depend on the UN 
Secretariat's methodical but time-consuming process for identifying issues requiring 
international attention or action.31  
With regard to selectivity, it can only be suggested that while every case of human rights 
abuse may not be treated in the same manner or resolved with the same determination by 
the international community, this does not mean all such attempts are futile. Selectivity is 
likely to exist for some time, however, if the aim is to deal one day with all human rights 
abuses, the first step is to deal with some, and eventually most, of the worst cases.  
Arguments in favor of maintaining order, then, are overly alarmist and place too high a 
moral value on the principle of state sovereignty. Recognizing a right to humanitarian 
intervention will not result in international anarchy and sanctioning by the United Nations 
should prevent abuse and selectivity from becoming the norm.  
Effectiveness  
A third criticism of humanitarian intervention is that it is largely ineffective. Military 
intervention, it is argued, is a simple and short-term solution to complex and long-term 
problems. In short, it is too little too late. No doubt, there is a great deal of truth to this 
criticism. Eradicating human suffering and firmly establishing basic human rights must 
be seen as a long-term project of economic and social development encouraged by 
international assistance to countries in need.  
However, two points must be made regarding this argument. First, if long-term 
development is taken as the alternative to humanitarian intervention it is clear that the 
international community is failing in this regard:  
If, as R.J. Vincent argues, seriousness about human rights is tested by success in 
addressing the human wrongs of poverty and starvation . . .'we liberals' are failing 
massively to address what Henry Shue calls the 'holocaust of neglect'. . . the 'silent 
genocide' of slow death through poverty and malnutrition of millions on this planet is 
seemingly accepted as a natural and inevitable condition of global politics.32
Second, even if the international community was committing serious effort and resources 
to long-term development programs, this would still not preclude short-term decisive 
action in the event of a major humanitarian crisis. In an examination of military responses 
to humanitarian crises Barry Posen, while arguing that armed intervention is highly 
problematic, claims that there is the potential to save lives given the right circumstances 
and a sufficient commitment of resources.33 If the ultimate goal is the protection and 
promotion of human rights, then clearly a variety of available means must be considered 
to achieve this end.  
Solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society have been examined with 
regard to humanitarian intervention. It has been suggested that, in keeping with a 
solidarist conception of humanity, all humans are ends in themselves and thus have a 
claim to basic human rights. It is in the context of sovereign states that humans are 
currently best able to realize their common rights. While respect for pluralism or the 
cultural uniqueness of different societies requires that states do not normally interfere in 
one another's affairs, this autonomy is not absolute. States which fail to provide for the 
most basic rights of their citizens lose their claim to complete autonomy and the 
international community must by default step in to protect human lives.  
Humanitarian intervention can be criticized on grounds of cultural relativism, the threat it 
poses to international order and its overall effectiveness. However, these concerns do not 
rule out such international action but rather demonstrate the need for prudence and 
consideration on a case by case basis. The UN Charter and international law permit 
intervention under Chapter VII, if one accepts that human rights are not just a domestic 
affair and have implications for international peace and security as a whole. Even 
pluralists will acknowledge that "humanitarian intervention is justified when it is in 
response to acts 'that shock the moral conscience of mankind.'"34 It is simply unclear 
from their perspective how much "shock" is required to trigger an intervention.  
Really, then, solidarist and pluralist conceptions of international society both admit to 
justifications for humanitarian intervention, albeit to quite different degrees. Solidarists 
forcefully advocate intervention to protect human rights and prevent suffering. 
Ultimately, pluralists recognize that occasionally intervention may be justified, but argue 
for extreme caution and prudence in so doing. Having established that intervention on 
humanitarian grounds is justified in cases of gross human rights abuses or catastrophic 
human suffering, it is necessary to determine whether this justification is recognized by 
the international community.  
International Practice  
While the debate over humanitarian intervention is centuries old, it has enjoyed a minor 
renaissance since the end of the Cold War. International crises that previously would 
have been viewed through the lenses of east-west rivalries are now being approached in a 
more pragmatic, if not cooperative, manner. However, if humanitarian intervention is 
justified in theory, as has been argued above, recognition of the principle in practise has 
been tenuous at best. A review of recent studies of humanitarian intervention 
demonstrates that there is only precarious acceptance of a norm for such action within the 
international community.  
While there is a general consensus that there are some positive changes taking place in 
the international protection of human rights, the degree of change and its future direction 
are highly contested. Nicholas Hopkinson argues that "the view now prevailing is that the 
observance of fundamental human rights know no national boundaries and therefore 
should no longer be disregarded on account of state sovereignty."35 Significantly, W. 
Ofuatey-Kodje observes that:  
. . . the Security Council stated explicitly that there is a connection between human rights 
violation and threats to peace and security, when it declared categorically that 'non-
military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields 
have become threats to peace and security' [UN Doc. S/PV 3046].36
Marrack Goulding, former Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, 
believes that the new willingness of the UN to use force in support of peace "could 
represent a decisive moment in the development of the organization."37  
However, countering this apparent support for an "embryonic"38 norm of humanitarian 
intervention are protestations that recent examples of UN military action are largely 
inconclusive on the issue. Several recent studies of post-cold war UN actions reveal only 
marginal international acceptance of a principle of intervention on humanitarian grounds. 
While reviewing recent examples of intervention is beyond the scope of this article, it is 
worth summarizing the conclusions of some writers in this regard.  
Studies of international intervention in Iraq, Yugoslavia and Somalia have suggested that 
while humanitarian concerns were raised in the respective Security Council Resolutions, 
none of these cases fits well the definition of humanitarian intervention.39 The 
intervention to aid the Kurds was humanitarian in focus but it was conducted with the 
reluctant acquiescence of the Iraqi government and must be viewed largely within the 
context of the Gulf War.  
In the former Yugoslavia, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission in 
Bosnia was no doubt humanitarian in its aims. However, even though the UNPROFOR 
mandate was renewed under Chapter VII, it was conducted largely with the consent of 
the warring factions.  
It is generally agreed that among the three, by far the best example of humanitarian 
intervention was Somalia. There the United States-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) 
was mandated under Chapter VII to employ "all necessary means to establish a secure 
environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."40 While it has been 
suggested that UNITAF was not an "intervention" per se, because there was no national 
government in existence at the time, there can be no doubt it was a significant landmark 
in the willingness of the international community to employ force to fulfill humanitarian 
objectives.  
Based on the above, it can be observed that, in spite of some convincing arguments and 
signs of progress, there is only marginal recognition of a principle of humanitarian 
intervention within the international community. Humanitarian concerns have proven to 
be important factors in recent UN actions, but far from the only ones. The absence of a 
well-established international norm of humanitarian intervention is thus a serious obstacle 
to the international community responding decisively to humanitarian crises. With this in 
mind, it is now necessary to look specifically at the case of Rwanda to determine if the 
embryonic norm of humanitarian intervention was advanced and what other obstacles 
may have prevented international action.  
RWANDA AND THE FAILURE TO ACT  
This section will examine the Rwandan genocide and civil war of 1994 and the failure of 
the international community to act in an effective and timely manner. It will be argued 
that the UN did eventually acknowledge a right to intervene in Rwanda on humanitarian 
grounds and that a number of other obstacles resulted in the failure to act decisively to 
stop the genocide.  
Background  
Inter-ethnic conflict in Rwanda has a long history and originates in social and political 
divisions between the country's two main ethnic groups, the minority Tutsis and majority 
Hutus. Prior to the events of 1994, the Tutsis and Hutus comprised approximately 14 
percent and 85 percent of the population respectively.41 Both the Tutsis and the Hutus 
have demonstrated a willingness to use the instruments of the nation-state to oppress one 
another when they enjoyed power.  
Historically, the Tutsis occupied positions of power and influence in the country, a 
situation that was reinforced and codified under Belgian trusteeship following the First 
World War.42 Following independence in 1962, government by majority rule and, later, 
a military coup, ensured that Hutus controlled the country for the next three decades. In 
1988, exiled Tutsis and opposition Hutus established the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
a military and political group aimed at returning exiled citizens to Rwanda and 
establishing a national government based on power-sharing between the two main ethnic 
groups.43 Armed conflict between the RPF and the Hutu-dominated Rwandan 
Government Army ensued. On 4 August 1993, the RPF and Rwandan government signed 
the Arusha Accords and requested a UN peacekeeping force to assist with 
implementation of their negotiated peace agreement.  
Security Council resolution 872, passed on 5 October 1993, established the United 
Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a peacekeeping force under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter. UNAMIR tasks were to establish a secure environment for a transitional 
government and planned elections, monitor compliance with the Arusha Accords and 
coordinate humanitarian activities. From the outset UNAMIR was plagued by problems, 
due in large part to insufficient resources and a lack of cooperation from the parties 
involved, notably in their efforts to establish a transitional government.44 In a country 
where the government usually served as a tool for one ethnic group to exercise power 
over another, cooperation was difficult to achieve. Moreover, reports were received from 
the field that Hutu militia extremists affiliated with the government, known as the 
Interahamwe, were arming themselves and were plotting to kill large number of Tutsis in 
Kigali.45  
On 6 April 1994, one day after the Security Council had extended the mandate of 
UNAMIR, the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi were killed when their plane was shot 
out of the air with a rocket as it approached the Kigali airport. Within an hour, the 
government controlled Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines was calling on the Hutu 
population to seek revenge on the Tutsis. What followed proved to be a well-orchestrated 
slaughter of all identified Tutsis and opposition moderate Hutu in Kigali by the Rwandan 
Government Army and Interahamwe, actions that soon spread to other towns and the 
countryside. A day after the assassination of the president, fighting resumed between the 
RPF and RGA. This is the background to the Rwandan crisis which, between April and 
June 1994, was to see an estimated 500,000 people die as a result of the genocide and 
civil war.46  
UN Response  
The initial reaction of the Security Council, when confronted with the deteriorating 
conditions in Rwanda, was to drastically reduce the size of UNAMIR in late April 1994. 
The remnants of the UNAMIR force, eventually dwindling to 444 poorly equipped and 
supported troops, attempted to negotiate local truces and provided protection for some 
20,000 Rwandan citizens from both ethnic groups in a variety of locations.47 However, 
as circumstances became increasingly grave, the Council did eventually act with the 
creation of UNAMIR II and, later, with the authorization of the French-led OPERATION 
TURQUOISE. It is important to understand the basis on which the Security Council acted 
in carrying out both these decisions, in order to determine whether Rwanda served as a 
precedent for humanitarian intervention.  
Based on the language of United Nations correspondence and Security Council 
resolutions, it is clear that humanitarian concerns were the prime justification for 
international intervention. The Secretary-General, writing to the Security Council on 29 
April 1994 and requesting that members re-examine their decision to downsize 
UNAMIR, estimated that 200,000 people were already dead, noted that the massacres 
were continuing and suggested evidence was becoming available of plans for a new wave 
of killings. Boutros-Ghali concluded "this humanitarian catastrophe is rightly a matter of 
growing anguish in Africa and the rest of the world and demands urgent action by the 
international community."48 The seriousness of the humanitarian problem, and in 
particular the brutal massacres, was acknowledged by and was the main focus of a formal 
statement by the president of the Security Council the following day.49  
In response to a request from the Security Council to provide a plan for more effective 
UN involvement, the Secretary-General submitted a contingency plan for an expanded 
mission, UNAMIR II, on 13 May 1994. The report noted that widespread killings 
continued and that "a major humanitarian crisis" had developed with more than 1 million 
displaced persons and refugees in need of food, water and basic medical care.50 The 
contingency plan for UNAMIR II called for 5,500 troops to be deployed to provide 
security for humanitarian organizations and establish safe conditions for civilians in need. 
The rules of engagement were to be defensive rather than based on "enforcement action"; 
however, in proposing that UN forces be permitted "to take action in self-defence against 
persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations,"51 UNAMIR II troops 
could act in a limited way to save lives. This focus on humanitarian based action was 
echoed by the Security Council in its approval of UNAMIR II.  
The preamble to Resolution 918 clearly advances the humanitarian nature of UNAMIR II 
and is worth quoting at length:  
Strongly condemning the ongoing violence in Rwanda and particularly condemning the 
very numerous killings of civilians . . .  
Deeply concerned that the situation in Rwanda . . . constitutes a humanitarian crisis of 
enormous proportions . . .  
Expressing once again alarm at continuing reports of systematic, widespread and flagrant 
violations of humanitarian law . . .  
Desiring in this context to expand the mandate of the Mission for humanitarian purposes . 
. .  
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict, and 
concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace 
and security in the region . . .52
It is only in the last paragraph of the preamble that the traditional Security Council 
concerns of international peace and security are raised and, even then, it is within the 
context of the humanitarian crisis. In mandating UNAMIR II to "contribute to the 
security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk . . . including 
the establishment . . . where feasible of secure humanitarian areas,"53 it is important to 
note that this was still authorized within the original Chapter VI mission of UNAMIR I.  
The Security Council was guilty here of committing a rather convenient ambiguity since, 
as Adam Roberts has observed, "these new roles were not based explicitly on the consent 
of government, because it was the government of Rwanda that was instigating or 
tolerating the mass killings."54 By maintaining the Rwandan operation under Chapter VI 
of the Charter and by stipulating that force was to be used in "self-defence," the Security 
Council avoided addressing directly whether this constituted outright intervention. The 
desired result was not entirely the same and thus it makes for a weak precedent. Such 
ambiguity was not, however, evident in the subsequent resolution authorizing 
OPERATION TURQUOISE.  
The international response to the call for UNAMIR II troops was underwhelming. No 
major powers came forward to support the operation and none of 19 governments that 
had troop standby arrangements with the UN agreed to participate.55 As a result of 
estimates that the new mission could take up to three months to establish in theatre, the 
Secretary-General recommended to the Security Council that it consider an offer from 
France to deploy immediately a task force under Chapter VII to deal with the 
humanitarian crisis until a handover could be affected with UNAMIR II. Citing the 
deployment of UNITAF in Somalia as a precedent, Boutros-Ghali suggested, on 20 June, 
that the French-led multinational operation be authorized under Chapter VII "to assure 
the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda."56  
The Security Council responded quickly to the Secretary-General's proposal, passing 
resolution 929 on 22 June 1994. The language of the resolution was dominated by 
humanitarian concerns:  
. . . stressing the strictly humanitarian character of this operation . . . Deeply concerned by 
the continuation of systematic and widespread killings of the civilian population . . . 
Recognizing that the current situation in Rwanda constitutes a unique case which 
demands an urgent response by the international community . . . Determining that the 
magnitude of the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda constitutes a threat to peace and security 
in the region . . . [the Security Council] authorizes Member States . . . to conduct the 
operation...using all available means to achieve the humanitarian objectives . . .57
Again, while a threat to international peace and security is alluded to, the motivation for 
and purpose of the operation are clearly humanitarian.  
The language of UN correspondence and Security Council resolutions makes it clear that 
humanitarian concerns were the prime consideration for authorizing UNAMIR II and 
OPERATION TURQUOISE. The UNAMIR II mandate was aimed at saving lives but 
relied on the passive support of the Rwandan government. However, in approving 
OPERATION TURQUOISE, the Security Council was explicitly authorizing armed 
intervention on humanitarian grounds. As will be discussed later, it has been argued that, 
in spite of the best intentions of Resolution 929, OPERATION TURQUOISE was also 
serving French interests. Even if this is true, though, the fact remains that intervention in 
a sovereign state to save human lives was eventually authorized by the UN.  
Having established that the norm of humanitarian intervention was advanced by the 
Security Council in dealing with Rwanda, it is necessary to examine other obstacles to 
decisive action being taken. These obstacles could be an inability to respond, due to 
insufficient warning or military incapacity, or an unwillingness to act. Each of these 
obstacles will be examined to determine which were relevant in the case of Rwanda.  
Information and Early Warning  
Certainly if the Security Council was not aware of what was happening in Rwanda its 
members can be excused for their belated response to the genocide. There is a good 
argument to be made for the failure of the UN to collect relevant information and analyse 
it with a view to identifying an international crisis. This was precisely the conclusion of 
two authoritative studies of the UN system examining the Rwandan crisis. The first, 
conducted by the Lessons Learned Unit of the UN Department of Peace-keeping 
Operations (DPKO), identified shortcomings in information collection and analysis both 
prior to and during the UNAMIR operation. The study determined that the UN 
understood poorly the nature of the conflict in Rwanda.58 This lack of understanding at 
the Security Council level was further aggravated by the traditional reluctance of the UN 
to conduct organized intelligence operations in the field. Within UNAMIR, "no capability 
was established to collect, analyse and disseminate information,"59 and thus, even if UN 
Headquarters had the ability to properly deal with field intelligence, none was reaching it 
in a systematic manner.  
These problems were echoed in an earlier study conducted by the Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR). The report identified the inability of the 
United Nations as a whole to recognize the warning signs of international crises:  
The UN was poorly organized to collect and flag information about human rights 
violations and certainly genocide. There was a failure in both the UN system and the 
NGO community to link human rights reports to dynamic analyses of social conflict so as 
to provide strategic policy choices.60
Without a proper system for identifying signs of crises and anticipating possible UN 
involvement, the Security Council is hindered in its ability to respond. The current 
system is too loose and dependent on the sporadic warnings of NGOs or the intelligence 
estimates of specific members of the Security Council, which are clearly open to biased 
interpretation and selectivity. Thus, the Secretary-General and the Security Council have 
a need to receive independent or "unfiltered" strategic analyses of international events.  
However, while reforms in the UN information collection and analysis process must be 
looked upon favorably, it is necessary to approach purported shortcomings in the system 
in the case of Rwanda with some skepticism. There can be little doubt that, regardless of 
deficiencies in the UN information system, the international community was well aware 
of the seriousness and nature of the crisis early on in Rwanda. The JEEAR study stated 
that:  
In the months immediately preceding the genocide, many additional signs indicated that 
the implementation of the Arusha Accords was faltering and that massive violence was 
being planned . . .. Detailed intelligence reports were passed to New York and the 
Belgian military authorities by the unofficial UNAMIR intelligence unit documenting the 
military training of militias, hidden arms caches, and plans for violent action. 
Unequivocal warnings reached the UN Secretariat in January regarding a planned coup, 
an assault on the UN forces to drive them out, provocations to resume the civil war, and 
even detailed plans for carrying out genocidal killings in the capital.61
The report concluded that "information on the genocide under way was already available 
when the final decision was made to reduce the force dramatically"62 on 21 April 1994.  
This conclusion is consistent with much of the language of Security Council statements 
and resolutions as the crisis developed. In his statement on 30 April 1994, the president 
of the Security Council pointedly remarked that "the killings of members of an ethnic 
group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime 
punishable under international law."63 When he wrote to the Security Council on 13 May 
1994, recommending the establishment of UNAMIR II, the Secretary-General stated that 
the international community had "witnessed with horror and disbelief the slaughter and 
suffering of innocent civilians," describing the effects as "atrocious."64 In approving 
UNAMIR II on 17 May 1994, the Security Council noted in the resolution preamble that 
"the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group, 
in whole or in part, constitutes a crime punishable under international law."65  
Any claims that the Security Council and its members were not aware of the nature of the 
crisis in Rwanda are difficult to believe; the language used in official UN statements and 
resolutions talk of genocide in all but name. Yet it was not until 31 May 1994 that the 
Secretary-General, in an update brief to the Security Council, concluded that "there can 
be little doubt that it [the killings] constitutes genocide."66 Only on 1 July did the 
Security Council express concern about reports of human rights violations, "including 
acts of genocide."67  
Claims that an inefficient early-warning system prohibited timely reaction in the case of 
Rwanda must be viewed with some doubt. While the UN information collection and 
analysis process clearly failed to anticipate the killings, sufficient information was 
available as the crisis unfolded to act decisively. Even if this information was not 
available from the UN, which it was, individual members of the Security Council were 
able to draw their own conclusions. As Kofi Annan, then Director of DPKO and currently 
the Secretary-General, has stated, it is "difficult to accept that member states with more 
intelligence-gathering capabilities than the UN did not know what was happening."68 It 
was clear to members of the Security Council early on that the massive human rights 
abuses and slaughter violated international law and probably constituted genocide by any 
conventional definition. Thus, the argument that the international community did not 
intervene because it was not aware of what was really going on in Rwanda is not a strong 
one.  
Incapacity  
A second possibility for why the international community did not respond is that it was 
simply unable to take any effective action in a timely manner. This is perhaps a stronger 
argument and is based on the proposition that military intervention would not have been 
effective and that there was insufficient time to plan and execute an intervention.  
As argued earlier, the effectiveness of any military intervention must be judged on a case 
by case basis. Here it is simply worth making a few observations. By far the most 
significant is the judgement of the senior military officer on the ground, Major-General 
Romeo Dallaire, Commander of UNAMIR:  
UNAMIR could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. As evidence, 
with the 450 men under my command during this interim, we saved and directly 
protected over 25,000 people and moved tens of thousands between the contact lines. 
What could a force of 5,000 personnel have prevented? Perhaps the most obvious answer 
is that they would have prevented the massacres in the southern and western parts of the 
country because they didn't start until early May nearly a month after the war had 
started.69
This assertion seems to be vindicated by the recognized success of OPERATION 
TURQUOISE, a force of some 2,800 troops, in saving thousands of lives.70 As the 
Synthesis Report of the JEEAR concluded, "while there are arguments on both sides, a 
case can be made that with a modest expansion of peacekeeping forces with a clear 
mandate to protect civilians, the international community could have halted or at least 
substantially checked the killings, especially during the first weeks."71 Thus, in the case 
of Rwanda, military action could have been effective in saving many lives. Given the 
good chances of success in saving lives, did the international community have the ability 
to respond on what was clearly not just short but immediate notice?  
Certainly much has been made of the inability of the United Nations to deploy troops 
rapidly in times of crisis. This inability arises in part from weaknesses in the UN staff 
system which fails to provide timely staff coordination for military operations. It is 
commonly accepted that military operations must be planned at the strategic, operational 
and tactical levels, yet the Secretariat and Security Council are poorly organized for both 
such tasks. Recent reforms within DPKO have made substantial improvements at the 
operational planning level.72 However, weaknesses continue in the provision of strategic 
military advice to the Secretary-General and in the considerable time lag in matching 
operational level headquarters for specific operations to their tactical units.  
To alleviate these staff, organizational and deployment shortcomings, considerable 
attention has been given to the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) capability 
at the disposal of the UN.73 To this end, several countries have committed to establishing 
the UN Standby Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), a vanguard force of about 
5,000 troops ready to deploy on short notice in times of crisis. However, the absence of 
such a force in 1994 cannot be seen as a significant obstacle to a rapid international 
response to the Rwandan crisis. A Canadian Government study in 1995 noted that several 
countries, as well as the NATO alliance, maintain "standby" troops capable of deploying 
anywhere in the world in a matter of days.74 Certainly the greatest illustration of the 
rapid response capability of some members of the international community was the 
French deployment of troops in support of OPERATION TURQUOISE. French troops 
arrived in theatre within hours of the Security Council approving the operation and the 
brigade was fully deployed within 24 hours.75  
Thus, the assertion that the international community was incapable of intervening in a 
timely manner to save thousands of lives must also be viewed with a large degree of 
skepticism. Certainly the UN process for planning, mounting and deploying troops needs 
to become more streamlined and efficient. However, given the profundity of the crisis, 
there was the capability within the international community to deploy substantial military 
forces quickly to halt the tide of killings sweeping across Rwanda. Which brings the 
discussion to the last obstacle to the deployment of such a force unwillingness on the part 
of states to take decisive action.  
Unwillingness to Respond  
Unwillingness by members of the international community to respond to an international 
crisis is caused by either a lack of clearly defined national interests in the area or a lack of 
public pressure on governments to act. In a study of recent UN involvement in 
international emergencies, Peter Jakobsen concluded that countries were far more likely 
to intervene in humanitarian crises if there was a perception of national interest involved 
and if media coverage generated public sympathy, resulting in what is often referred to as 
the "CNN effect."76 Both of these factors are key to understanding why the international 
community and the Security Council were slow and unenthusiastic in responding to the 
deteriorating events in Rwanda.  
The fact of the matter is that there was little international interest in Rwanda both before 
and during the genocide crisis. Only two countries, Belgium and France, had anything 
approaching direct interests in the area; even then these interests were more "traditional" 
than extant.  
Aside from its trusteeship of Rwanda following World War One, Belgium was an early 
sponsor of negotiations leading to the Arusha Accords and it had deployed a battalion of 
infantry in support of the original UNAMIR operation. However, when it became clear 
that Belgian troops were gravely at risk, following the killing of ten paratroopers at the 
outbreak of violence, the government and public quickly lost their commitment to the 
mission and their contingent was withdrawn in the second week of April 1994.77  
France was the only permanent member of the Security Council with any direct interests 
in Rwanda. The French had been a long-time supporter of the Hutu regime and were 
concerned that victory by the RPF would undermine French influence in the Great Lakes 
Region.78 It has been suggested that these concerns help explain France's support for the 
UNAMIR mission, as it would have helped maintain the existing regime and create a 
"buffer" of UN troops to hamper the progress of the RPF.79  
It has been argued also that, in spite of the best intentions of Resolution 929, 
OPERATION TURQUOISE was merely serving French interests. The safe-havens 
established under the French were only in the west and south-west of the country in 
territory held by RGA forces, thereby blocking, at least temporarily, the advance of the 
RPF. Since the RPF opted not to enter the safe zones, many soldiers of the RGA and 
perpetrators of the genocide were able to escape across the border of Zaire and into the 
refugee camps.80  
These arguments must be balanced against the thousands of lives saved by the French 
operation. While French motives were likely mixed, OPERATION TURQUOISE clearly 
served UN humanitarian objectives.  
Other than Belgium and France, then, few countries, besides Rwanda's neighbours, 
appeared to have any interest in the country or the outcome of the crisis. The composition 
of the Security Council at the time is revealing in this regard. Besides the five permanent 
members, Brazil, Argentina, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Spain, the Czech Republic, 
Oman, Djibouti and, ironically, Rwanda, were sitting on the Council during the crisis.81 
The presence of only two other African states on the Council, combined with the general 
neglect of sub-Saharan Africa in the foreign policies of most nations,82 limited the 
body's interest in Rwanda. Certainly there was no desire among the permanent members 
to become involved. As the JEEAR report observes: "Apart from France, the major 
powers on the [Security] Council were uninterested in a small Central African country 
that was marginal to their economic or political concerns, and peripheral to international 
strategic rivalries."83  
The same could not be said for other international trouble spots where the UN was 
actively engaged in the spring and summer of 1994. Yugoslavia and Haiti both had wider 
implications for regional stability or were in areas of interest to one or more of the 
permanent members of the Security Council.  
It is hardly surprising, then, that the international community suffered from a degree of 
"strategic distraction" as events were unfolding in Rwanda. The lack of interests meant 
that those countries best able to provide troops and resources to intervene were not 
forthcoming, even after UNAMIR II was authorized. In fact, past experiences and 
ongoing commitments with other more high profile operations meant that many states 
were decidedly cool to supporting action in Rwanda: "After Somalia, there was no 
enthusiasm among the US or other Western members of the Security Council to risk their 
soldiers in another messy and open-ended civil war . . .."84  
Thus, in spite of an obvious humanitarian crisis, gross violations of international law and 
an international consensus on the need to act, a lack of national interests proved a major 
factor in the decision of individual governments not to take decisive action. States only 
began to commit to taking action once public outcry, caused by extensive media 
coverage, made it impossible for them to remain inactive.  
There can be little doubt that the media plays a major role in mobilizing public, and thus 
political, support for humanitarian interventions. As Jakobsen observes: "That no conflict 
has been put on the international agenda without sustained television coverage supports 
the finding that the CNN effect can be regarded as a necessary condition for humanitarian 
enforcement."85  
The lack of media coverage of events in Rwanda helps explain, in part, why state 
governments were less inclined to become involved. The JEEAR report concluded that 
"inadequate and inaccurate reporting by international media on the genocide itself 
contributed to international indifference and inaction."86 Conversely, increased media 
coverage of the human suffering in Rwanda helped create French public support for 
OPERATION TURQUOISE, particularly once it became clear that the perpetrators of the 
genocide had earlier received military support from France.87 Intense media coverage 
and public outcry over the crisis in the refugee camps in the wake of the genocide, helps 
explain why aid money and Western military support were eventually forthcoming.  
Rwanda demonstrates that, in the absence of perceived national interests, many 
governments only reluctantly become involved in humanitarian intervention under 
pressure from citizens concerned at the suffering they see through the eyes of the 
international media. Public concern forces governments to expand national interests to 
include preventing mass deaths and human suffering. While this broadening of interests 
violates traditional conceptions of foreign policy objectives, "countries are made up of 
individuals, and in democracies their wishes are meant to be reflected."88 The 
broadening of national interests to encompass the preservation of life and reduction of 
human suffering will, more than any factor, help to establish the norm of humanitarian 
intervention.  
CONCLUSION  
The death of a half a million people in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 must be viewed as 
an abysmal failure on the part of the international community to respond to a 
humanitarian crisis of proportions rarely seen. This article set out to examine why this 
failure occurred. It argued that there is both theoretical and legal justification for 
humanitarian intervention but suggested that such a principle is only marginally 
recognized in international practice. Rwanda, in this regard, serves as a precedent and has 
helped advance an embryonic norm of humanitarian intervention. However, the 
unwillingness of members of the international community to commit military forces to 
prevent the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans, in the absence of clear 
national interests, also demonstrates how far there is to go in establishing a general 
principle or practice of humanitarian intervention.  
The case of Rwanda raises a number of other issues for consideration. First, some thought 
must be given to determining the types of humanitarian crises which might "trigger" UN 
intervention. While the effort to define such triggers will be resisted by many states, it 
may serve to confirm in the minds of others the conditions that demand international 
action.  
Second, governments, particularly in the West, must confront the fact that they likely will 
face increased public pressure to take action during humanitarian emergencies in the 
future. An expansion of national interests to include more international humanitarian and 
development issues may help prevent unstable regions of the world exploding into crises. 
The preservation of basic human rights and promotion of other humanitarian objectives 
require not only political and military stability, but social and economic stability as well.  
Third, the composition and concerns of the Security Council require examination. If the 
Council is to properly fulfill its mandate of maintaining international peace and security, 
it must remain vigilant over all regions of the world. Recent proposals to increase the size 
of the Security Council by adding new non-permanent members from Africa and other 
regions may, if implemented, expand the body's agenda to include previously 
marginalized members of the international community.89 Likewise, Council members 
must recognize the returns provided from modest investments in peace initiatives and 
operations. The millions of dollars required to effectively support the original UNAMIR 
mission pale in comparison to the billions spent on humanitarian aid in the Great Lake 
Regions since the genocide.  
Finally, statesmen must ask themselves whether there is not an underlying bias in 
international peace and security initiatives. If a half a million people were threatened with 
murder and suffering in Europe or the Americas, would so many governments have been 
so hesitant in responding in an effective and timely manner?  
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